Much has been written on Diem's death on November 2nd 1963, a fateful event and turning point in the history of the American involvement in Vietnam. Many new facts have emerged as historians and Vietnamese watchers were reevaluating the US intervention, namely its removal of president Diem resulting in his assassination. And the debate goes on unabated between the opposing schools of thought who are still at odds over the rationale of direct US military action.
On one hand, there were those who advocated the US involvement in terms of morality, as the right and honorable thing to do, to fight against Communist aggression and expansion. The so called war hawks like John Foster Dulles in the fifties, Barry Goldwater in the sixties and many members of the GOP would represent that label. Even the liberal John F. Kennedy could be included among them.
On the other hand, there were those who vehemently opposed the war, also on ideological and moral ground including many Democratic presidential candidates like senator Eugene McCarthy, senator McGovern, the so called peace doves. And not mentioning some odd names like Jane Fonda and Noam Chomsky who stole the headlines by behaving like vicious doves during the whole episode.
Among historians and scholars, the same argument became apparent, with the ''traditionalists'' arguing that the war was a lost cause and being fought on faulty premises, that the US vital interests were not at stake in that part of the world. They still represent the majority view of US opinion about the war. Some of the war supporters did switch side and joined the dovish camp as the war became more and more unpopular.
Finally there are the revisionist historians who do believe that the war could be won, had it been fought differently. Mark Moyar with his 2007 book ''Triumph Forsaken '' is among them. This group portrays the Vietnam war as a lost opportunity for the US to make things right in South East Asia, that victory was possible had the US persevered in the struggle by having a better and more realistic view of Asian culture and its complexity. From the litany of blunders the US had committed, I would focus on 10 major points as my observations came about after reading Moyar's excellent book.
1.The Chinese Syndrome
The success of Mao Tse Tung in 1949 as a major experiment of Communism in Asia was a priceless lesson for Ho chi Minh. The People's Army victory under Mao's leadership inspired uncle Ho and his foot soldiers in defeating the French. Ho Chi Minh had much to learn from Mao's experience against nationalist Tchiang Kai Chek. With massive aid to the Viet Minh, including military advisers and a Chinese general fighting among them, the Vietnamese outmaneuvered the French after the battle of Hoà Bình in 1952. The tide has turned against the occupiers and their Dien Bien Phu defeat in May 1954 was a foregone conclusion.
Despite a 1000 year of rivalry and conflict, China and Vietnam had a very close relationship under Ho and Mao. And they got along better than Diem and his American ally. They spoke the same language (Ho was fluent in Mandarin), ate the same rice and upheld the same ideology while using the same repressive methods. Unlike Diem, Ho didn't need to worry about coup attempt or regime change from his Chinese big brother. Moreover Giap the architect of the Vietnamese military supremacy over the French knew by heart Mao people's war and his tactics of guerrilla warfare that had been proven in China. Counter insurgency and anti-guerrilla methods used by Thompson and Lansdale although effective in Malaysia and the Philippines were not transferable to the conditions in Vietnam.
Chairman Ho with deteriorating health in 1964 relegated his power to secretary general Le Duan who tilted even more towards Mao according to Mark Moyar. The Chinese supplanted the reluctant Soviets in providing heavy weaponry and equipment to the Vietnamese who channeled them South through an extended system of supply routes, by land through Laos and Cambodia, or by sea along the Vietnam coastal line. The North decided to massively increase its military presence in the South after being tipped that they would not be subjected to a US ground invasion. President Johnson decision not to expand the war and spare the North of land attack in early 1965 was a momentous reprieve for the Communists who then decided to push for an aggressive campaign to confidently crush and decimate the ARVN. US inhibition to unleash its full military might was seen as a sign of weakness for fear of Chinese direct intervention.
2. The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the extraterritorial edge
The North Vietnamese adaptability was well known as they relied heavily on the topographic element to their maximum advantage. I remember asking my Vietnamese teacher in Saigon about the war and his answer stuck with me since. The Communists he told me, considered nature as an asset, not an obstacle. The Americans although optimistic and pragmatic had an apprehensive attitude towards the physical terrain in Vietnam, viewed as a remote, challenging terra incognita and another enemy to deal with.
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The Ho Chi Minh Trail was the perfect example of North Vietnamese creative adaptability. It was the cornerstone of their military success in the South according to their own sources. And it remains one of the unanswered mystery of the conflict. For some reason this monumental logistical undertaking, 'the greatest achievement of the 20th century' by US observers' own admission, hasn't been widely reported. The Ho Chi Minh Trail was never severely disrupted during the war, despite massive US bombings and it speaks volume about the Communist determination to maintain the battlefield initiative and dictate the issue of the war.
The material and human cost that the North Vietnamese had spent into building, protecting and maintaining the Trail during the war can only be described with superlatives. With its multitask functions as a impregnable sanctuary, a strategic stronghold, an intricate supply line and infiltration route, a R&R center, a pipeline conduit, the Trail was the greatest challenge for the American military planners in the war of attrition. The infiltration of new Communist troops and materiel from the North always outpaced their losses. Under the best of circumstances for the US, the war would become a stalemate. A victorious outcome depended upon the outright interdiction or an effective dismantling of the Trail. Unfortunately it wasn't the case.
This far reaching aspect also demonstrates the inability of actual NATO forces for achieving decisive victory against the insurgents in Afghanistan. The situation is even more upsetting because the Taliban are by no means a fighting force comparable to the NVA, with no structure of command and control. What they have are well dug in sanctuaries along the Pakistani porous border in Waziristan, and despite sophisticated tracking measures, NATO troops are unable to pursue them. The current conflict in Afghanistan is as close a replica of what we were facing 50 years ago in Vietnam in terms of extraterritorial advantage for the other side.
The Pakistanis play a deceptive game by providing funding, training and intelligence to the Jihadists while offering their uncontrolled western territory to the insurgents, a kind of Mullah Omar Trail. More importantly, the generation of mid level troops in the Pakistan Army fighting along the Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviets [with the CIA help] and then against the Northen Alliance in the civil war in the 1990s are now the senior officers in charge of key organizations like the ISI.(Inter-Sevices Intelligence). They are complicit in aiding the Taliban combating NATO forces to a standstill. To my knowledge, the prospect for a quick end to the conflict is more elusive than ever. The alternative strategy has been a program of Afghanization without its name. We might be witnessing the beginning of another ''decent interval'' in Central Asia.
3. Military strategies and tactics: Human factor versus human material value
During the war, we heard buzz words about the US tactical plans like 'search and destroy', 'occupy and hold', 'massive firepower' etc. And we were led to believe that Giap relied on human waves assault to win his battles. Giap would prefer convoy ambush and the 'hit and run' tactic at the early stage of the war. As a student of Napoleon's campaigns he had carefully studied, Giap relied on speed and surprise until he had numerical superiority for the KO punch. Giap was criticized by Westmoreland for using his battalions as canon fodders to achieve victory. He said that Giap as a commander in the US Army would have been dismissed for the untold casualties inflicted upon his troops. In response Giap would have said ''So what?'' For Giap, the human spiritual factor was paramount and supersedes its expendable physical value.
Giap found his match during the war in John McNamara for they had such a contrast in style as well as in substance and each one personifying his country embodiment of the war. McNamara relied upon numbers and graphs for his decision making. Any facts were translated into mathematical fomula or ratio, as an investment banker would do to measure success. The technical whiz kid was pitted against the historian philosopher. But how do you measure the enemy's will to fight? How do you differentiate a communist infiltrator from an ordinary nhà quê? What number would ascertain the (in)stability of a government?
McNamara by playing heavily with the number's game fell into his own trap. Measuring military and political phenomenon in an unconventional war is like predicting earthquake with a statistical model. Optimism based on numbers is well removed from identifying success. The human factor, innate and malleable is still beyond the realm of science to fathom its quality and spirit. By McNamara own confession in his Memoirs, the policies and methods he pursued based on quantitative methods were ''terribly wrong'' with a total lack of sensitivity and knowledge of the enemy's motive and strength.
4. Democracy and the politics of instability
US political leaders in Washington were fixated by the political situation in South VN and the instability it created during the numerous changes of government after the fall of Diem in 1963. We could count at least a dozen coups or attempts, or one every 6 months, during the early 1960s, a clear sign that Diem exit was the beginning of the end for South Vietnam's viability. One doesn't need to be an expert to notice the unmistakable harm caused by Diem's removal. It created a political vacuum so blatant that the war effort was in disarray. The US fateful decision to deploy combat troops in early 1965 and the successive buildups were mainly to compensate for the continuing worsening of the political situation in the South, barring its total collapse. Despite all the warning signs, Washington just kept pouring in more troops to redress the situation. No military solution has ever resolved a nation marred by political problems. It's like adding more heavy stones on a broken roof to insure it doesn't cave in!
Due to the total ignorance of Vietnamese politics, society and culture (from McNamara own words), the Americans continually put pressure on Diem government to be more inclusive and representative with the participation of opposition members. What must be understood is that Vietnam, like many third world nations, had no tradition of democratic practice and still doesn't. Acceding to power was tough for Diem, after having to rein over numerous adversaries especially the remaining colonialists and their cohorts: the Binh Xuyen, the religious sects, the discontented generals etc...But to stay in power and survive the next day was even tougher, while facing the mortal danger from the North. It's a matter of life and death for the lonely Diem.
Democracy as the US envisioned was a luxury South Vietnam could ill afford. Diem and Nhu under US constant harassment felt they had to tread a fine line between a realistic course of action with uncertain result versus an utopian possibility with no result at all. Acording to M. Moyar: '' At the beginning of 1964, 62 political parties vied for power in Saigon...'' and ''Diem's predictions about the harmful effects of political liberalism in an authoritarian-minded and factious South Vietnam were coming true''. For the well informed Vietnamese including the politicians who decried Diem as despotic, democracy as the Americans saw it is a myth and an impossible demand. And the US never succeeded in extracting concessions from Diem (or any other leaders that came after him), to liberalize his regime. This is the frustrating dilemma facing America in helping undemocratic sectarian nations combating against ruthless monolithic regimes.
5. Leadership deficit
Diem's reluctance or refusal to heed US advice on political reform could be explained by the lack of skilled personnel to run key positions in the government Inept and corrupt officials had to be eliminated, but to be replaced by who? There's no plethora of experienced people, civilian or military that Diem could count on, the best option was to use his family members for their reliability and obedience. The problem was more dramatic at the top when the US was plotting against Diem and looking for an alternative leadership. It was a tragic comic situation when US policy makers were preparing many lists and finding no suitable names.
Kennedy was hesitant to topple Diem for that very reason when he couldn't find any candidate capable of pursuing the conduct of the war. Even the anti-Diem faction in the White House hadn't come up with any name as an alternative. The VN generals who were plotting against Diem didn't even appear on the list although US officials seemed upbeat about gen. Nguyen Khanh, a Diem supporter. He was depicted as ''bright and energetic'' and a strong leader in the making. Three months after Diem's death, when the lackluster coup leaders were thrown out by Khanh, he turned out to be the worst of the lot, an inexperienced, manipulative and demagogic strongman with no backbone. It was to be the worst period of political uncertainty in Vietnam. By eliminating Diem, the US endured a series of new Diem minus his talent.
Strong leaders are a precious commodity in a war stricken country. The Communist North was blessed with Ho chi Minh at the helm with his first generation revolutionary comrades and lieutenants. But there was no Cesar or Bonaparte to rise up and fulfill the sacred duty in the South. The US would be content 50 years ago with a Vietnamese (general) Sissi of Egypt and quell the political turmoil that plagued Saigon. All the criticism against the new Egyptian strongman nowadays is solely for the US domestic consumption. The Egyptian army, like the Vietnamese, remains the only institution that projects authority and commands respect in an undemocratic and factious society. The US must breath a sigh of relief when he unseated the wishy washy Morsi contrary to US official public reaction.
6. Vietnamization as an exit strategy
After 4 years of continued military escalation with 525,000 ground troops deployed and no ''light at the end of the tunnel'', the US policy makers decided to reverse course. They deescalated the fighting, reduced their casualty number and put the Vietnamese army to the test. US presence was gradually phasing out while they maintained maximum pressure on the North with more bombings. With the beginning of the Paris talks in 1968, the US was embarking on a path of military disengagement by turning over to the South the main responsibility of the fight, until all US troops leave in 1972, with the signing of the Peace Accord.
The American exit strategy sounded great on paper especially when the US home front started to get awry as the antiwar movement was gaining momentum. The orderly and smooth transition to a South Vietnamese takeover, the kind of ''peace with honor'' as Nixon put it was fraught with danger. Deep inside, US leaders were afraid that some pieces of the delicate exit strategy puzzle were missing. They had serious doubts that the South would pull it off, without US direct assistance once the withdrawal would be complete. After so many years of relying on US manpower and firepower, the South was hard pressed to relinquish massive air support, lavish equipment and ordinance. It was coined as a ''poor man army forced to fight a rich man war''.
Despite the talk of unconventional warfare, special forces and counterinsurgency strategy, the war was inevitably conducted with heavy spending on military hardware i.e ''fighting the war the American way''. When the US forces were leaving, the South was flooded with military hardware just before the Peace treaty took effect (the Paris Accord only allowed replacement of weapons on the basis of one on one). This situation did more harm than good for it was costly to maintain these equipment and without funding for their maintenance and proper use, they ended up on the black market and in the hands of the enemy.
The US culture of investing on technology and machinery instead of investing on people creates a dilemma for poor nations unaccustomed to gadget. And heavy reliance on them means that inevitably you will squander them. The Iraqis did not draw the lesson of Vietnam and are now paying a heavy price. Their military hardware provided by the US amounting to 15 billion $ just went up in smoke after the abrupt fall of Mossul to.the more dedicated ISIS insurgents. Iraq is falling apart due to an unsolvable sectarian war and victim of an ill conceived US exit strategy just as South Vietnam went down the drain after its Vietnamization. Like the question of democracy, there are limits for undeveloped nations to sustain a culture of techncal material dependency that would incite human complacency and waste .
7. Watergate
One of the lessons the Vietnamese have learned to regret was their scant knowledge of the American political process. The Vietnamese political leaders imagined that US commitment was a given, due to its prestige and overwhelming power of influence and persuasion. They took for granted that US would never abandon their friends, under any circumstance. This complacency or illusion originated from an unfounded conviction that the US has an imperative obligation to keep VN free from Communism. From the Vietnamese viewpoint, they believed they were holding the trump cards against their stronger ally and that their underlying weakness could be a strength. They bet that the US with all the resources already spent and blood being spilled couldn't quit in the middle of the fight.
South Vietnamese leaders lacked effective engagement with American political institutions. The North Vietnamese tended to dismiss the US government as indecisive and naive, constrained by a competing Congress and intimidated by a critical US public easily swayed by Communist manipulation and propaganda. By contrast the South Vietnamese would consider the US president as Superman with tremendous power. With no democratic record of their own, they assumed the US Congress to resemble their own National Assembly a kind of rubber stamp club at the disposal of the White House occupant. No major effort was made to gain influence over Congress members to turn them to their cause. No Vietnamese lobby group ever existed to impress the US Congress in favor of continued US commitment and support. The Vietnamese never understood that the US Congress, a ''subsidiary'' branch could impeach a president and remove him from office.
Although there were plenty of warning signs that the American public was fed up with the war, the Watergate affair in 1972 didn't raise any alarm bell for the Vietnamese. It was after all just a third rate burglary attempt! Things started to unravel with Congress failing to pass the appropriation bill for a supplemental 300 million $ aid package to South VN in 1973, putting a squeeze on Vietnamese defense spending which was reduced by 50% subsequently. With Nixon fighting for his political life, Kissinger went around the globe looking for a financial bailout of its embattled ally. King Faisal of Saudi was sympathetic to the Vietnamese cause and promised to help. Unfortunately he was murdered not long after and the aid did not materialize. The Nixon resignation was a total shock for the Vietnamese and the message was loud and clear: Vietnam will be on its own from then on. The clock already started ticking in 1974 for a complete humiliating exit of the US.
8. US determination and commitment
Notwithstanding the grandiloquent words about the fight for freedom and the struggle for self determination etc, the main reason for the US intervention in Vietnam was the domino theory. The strategy of containment against Communism expansion spreading like a bush fire across Eastern Europe, sweeping through mainland China, gaining foothold in North Vietnam and threatening the rest of South East Asia was the cornerstone of US foreign policy in the 1950s. Moyar's book suggested that the Kennedy administration decision to draw the line in Vietnam came about following two unrelated but concordant sets of event. First, Kennedy decided to bolster Diem after the botched Cuban invasion, and repair his image as being an amateurish and ill advised leader. And following his meetings with Kruschev in Vienna in 1961 whereby Kennedy felt outclassed and humiliated by the secretary general, he had decided to reassert US interests against the Soviets head on anywhere in the world. South East Asia was the place he decided to make a stand.
Apart from Kennedy's haphazard motives, US commitments towards its allies tended to be fragile and unsteady for a host of reasons. In hindsight, the inspiring and solemn declarations by successive US presidents to stand by its friends for the long haul, to fight as long as it takes, to be unwavering etc., seemed hollow and outlandish. With the constraint imposed by the electoral process of a 4 year presidential mandate, a foreign policy commitment made by an American president is limited in that time span. And it's more like a one-year lease renewable 4 times, although reinforced by the unwritten rule of.bipartisanship.
US foreign policy depends not only on its vital national interest but more importantly on the stream of good news the US public receives day in day out from its television set. As a nation with a mindset for quick results and averse to unhappy news, any US staying power involving an intricate and protracted conflict would face big challenge. A well defined and well explained mission armed with a good cause is no guaranty for a happy outcome. American foreign policy supported by the great resources of the greatest nation lacks an essential element: time and patience.
9. Freedom of the press and its impact
Protected by their inalienable right under the Constitution , the US news industry people are an enterprising bunch, with an aggressive attitude in their search for scoops and hot news, sold to the highest bidder. With the well known principle that good news aren't any news, so there are no better news than bad news. The unpopular Vietnam war, with its complexity and contradictions in a remote setting was the perfect case for newsmen to test their resourcefulness as merchants of bad news and tragedies.
The press situation during the war is a sensitive and difficult topics to discuss. M. Moyar and the revisionist camp seem to be convinced that American newsmen played a major role in hurting the US resolve and they were mostly to blame for the debacle. It's true that if domestic TV viewers were fed incessantly with discouraging news of death and destruction in a war with no end in sight, sooner or later the public mood would go sour and start to unravel. But the other half of the coin i.e the US government officials is also at fault.
US policy makers were caught having to juggle many conflicting interests. On one hand the autocratic Diem and his government had only contempt for the press people, foreign and local. They were the least in Diem's priority to deserve attention. On the other hand US officials, although supportive of Diem and unsympathetic to the critical press per say, had to defend the right to freedom of expression and intervene against its host nation's mishandling. It was a very delicate balancing act and US officials by siding with the discredited Vietnamese were making their own position even less tenable. As the war situation went downhill and the rumor mills were working at full throb, the resort to secrecy and misinformation became more tempting and the whole conduct of the war turned into a self defeating exercise. The verdict is still out there, for who to blame for the loss of Vietnam, the brazen and misguided press people or the paranoid policy makers who didn't know how to deal with them.
10. Concluding remarks
So many experts and scholars have written books and reports about this conflict. Most of them have their own ideas about the causes of its failure. My opinion on the matter is somewhere among them. Nobody has definitive answers about the tragic outcome of that war and we are still learning. With the revisionist writings, we are questioning and challenging more and more old cliches. I remain somewhat skeptical that any new revelations would show that the war could have been won had it been fought differently.
What things could have we done differently?
a. Embrace and support Ho Chi Minh while he was hiding in the jungle and make him one of our own?
b. Support the French by bombing the Viet Minh with nuclear devices in 1954 at Dien Bien Phu?
c. Get rid of Diem in 1955 instead of doing so in 1963 and saving 9 years of headache?
d. Not overthrow him in 1963 and supporting him all the way?
e. Neutralize South Vietnam as the French had suggested in 1964?
f. Invade the North and possibly China while fighting in the South in 1964?
g. Going for broke with intensive bombings of the North with naval blockade?
h. Going nuclear in both the North and the South?
and the most interesting idea of all,
i. Declare victory in Vietnam and withdraw in 1964?
These are the questions I asked myself more than once and still do not have any satisfactory answer.
LN Ottawa, July 2014
